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Last month, millions of Americans 
were watchin9 and talking about "The Winds of War '-a week-long series of 
televised dramatizations of the events, pri-
marily in Western Europe and the United 
States, that led to the Second World War 
and to this country's ultimate participation. 
This month, f am sorry to say, the 
"winds of war" are beginning to stir once 
again in Western Europe and the United 
States-not a war with nuclear or conven-
tional weapons, fortunately, but a tragic, 
costly war nevertheless. I am referring to 
the prospects of a trade war, specificafly an 
agricultural trade war between the United 
States and the European Economic 
Community. 
I. 
Use of the word "war" is not an exag-
geration. The United States Government, 
faced with mounting surpluses here at 
home, and a lack of restraint by the Euro-
pean Economic Community in encroaching 
upon traditional U.S. export markets, has 
condemned the $6 billion a year export sub-
sidy program of the EEC and vowed that 
we will no longer play the part of the su-
pine giant. Leaders of the EEC, with their 
own record crops to worry about, have in 
return condemned the U.S. Government for 
using its new subsidy scheme of blended 
credits as well as surplus government 
stocks to take away some of Europe's tradi-
tional markets, such as wheat for Morocco 
and wheat flour for Egypt. Efforts at nego-
tiation on these issues have failed. Efforts 
to obtain a meaningful CATT adjudication 
have failed. Both sides appear unyielding. 
Both sides are preparing new counter-
measures. 
The New 'rbrk Times quotes a French 
trade official as saying: "We are on the 
verge of war." U.S. Secretary of Agricul-
ture John Block says: "We have had all that 
we can stand." The West Europeans 
threaten again to restrict our duty free ac-
cess of corn gluten feed and even soybeans 
and soybean meal-trade which now 
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amounts to $4 billion annually. The U.S. 
government, urged on by an angry Con-
gress, now threatens to dump dairyJrod-
ucts and to use its own subsidies an 
surpluses to undercut the world price in 
stiff more markets. An EEC official called 
the U.S. sale of wheat flour to Egypt "A 
brutal takeover." Secretary of State George 
Schultz recently remarked "We should 
remember that these are insane things we 
are doing." The Europeans reply that a 
country with tariffs and import quotas, 
some supposedly voluntary, on beef, veal, 
sugar, dairy products, tobacco, mandarin 
oranges, cotton, peanuts and even mush-
rooms, is interested only in free markets 
elsewhere. 
American officials say that the EEC is 
violating the rules of CATT. EEC officials 
say that we are. CATT shows signs of be-
ing too cumbersome and too politicized to 
settle anything. Confrontation is the order 
of the day and escalation may come at any 
moment. 
This is not the first time that Western 
Europe and the United States have faced 
the tnreat of an agricultural trade war. But 
this time both sides have hardened their 
positions and reached for their weapons. 
This time the consequences would oe more 
serious than at any time in the last forty 
years. Despite encouraging signs of recov-
ery in the United States, the western world 
is suffering from a prolonged economic 
slump. Enormous amounts of indebted-
ness, high rates of interest, rapid currency 
fluctuations, and rising political tensions 
now combine to make tne economies of all 
Western nations more volatile and more 
vulnerable than ever before. In every Con-
gress and Parliament, popular pressures 
for economic nationalism are increasing as 
a result of hard times, not only in agricul-
ture but in steel, automobiles, textiles, elec-
tronics and most other manufactured 
products. 
Indeed, even as we face in Europe the 
prospect of a trade war in agriculture 
spreading to industry, we face in China the 
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danger of a trade war in industry-specifi-
cally textiles-spreading to agriculture. 
Because China Fi.as only recently become 
the single largest importer of U.S. wheat in 
the world, a "two-front" trade war in 
which this country simultaneously con-
fronted both China and the EEC would be 
a nightmare. 
Moreover, international trade in gen-
eral, and agricultural trade by and among 
the industrialized nations in particular, 
have become far more important now to 
the economic health of the west than was 
true fifty years ago or even ten years ago. 
Substantial increases in living standards 
around the world have led to demands for 
richer diets, particularly meat. The United 
States, as the dominant agricultural ex-
porter in the world, woula have the most 
to lose from an all-out trade war. 
Elimination of this nation's $6.5 billion 
trade surplus with Europe, our largest cus-
tomer as well as our competitor, would . 
inflict serious hardship not only on Amen-
can farmers, already mired in debt and 
declining profit but also on the processors, 
carriers, handlers, equipment manufac-
turers, bankers, merchants and others who 
depend upon the economic strength _and 
progress of those farmers. We sometimes 
forget their importance to our economy. 
The newest forms of high technology may_ 
receive more attention in most of t~e pubh_c 
debates on economic growth; but, m fact, 1t 
is man's oldest occupation, agriculture, 
that is the largest dollar earner in our bal-
ance of trade and responsible for about 15 
percent of this country's GNP. 
In this context, an outbreak of a U.S.-
EEC trade war in agriculture, complete 
with deliberately provocative measures, 
counter-measures, retaliation, and escalat-
ing tariffs and quotas, could easily sp!ead 
into manufactured products and services, 
restricting the flow of goods, cutting sales, 
increasing prices, retarding recovery and 
thereby prolonging and worsening the eco-
nomic slump of the 1980's as mucn or more 
as it did in the 1930's. 
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II. 
What can be done to stern this tide of 
events before it is too late? Some of the 
bloodiest wars in human history began 
when a shot was fired or a threat fulfilled 
without either side truly wanting war and 
with both sides realizing, in their cooler 
moments, that they faced incalculable and 
unjustifiable losses. But politics and pride, 
nationalism and emotion, brinksrnanship 
and anger, drove them to the brink and 
then over it. 
And so it is with a trade war in agricul-
ture. Most farm audiences today will cheer 
a speech denouncing the Europeans, dis-
missing GAIT, calling for more U.S. subsi-
dies and less U.S. restraint. But that 
short-term view can lead to long-term 
disaster, to a trade war bringing economic 
havoc and political disarray to the West, 
and to the disruption and even the destruc-
tion of the solid network of international 
economic practices and institutions that 
has been carefully built and steadily liberal-
ized over the past generation. 
I speak today, therefore, in an urgent 
plea to both sides to hold their fire, to con-
sider the somber lessons of the past, and to 
develop a brighter plan for the future. I am 
not suggesting that this war should be pre-
vented oy U.S. appeasement or surrender. 
Nor am f suggesting that the differences 
that divide the two sides are small or imag-
inary. This crisis was created by real prob-
lems that require real solutions. But a brief 
look at the past tells us at least where a 
solution cannot be found. 
First, history teaches us that there is no 
solution in unilateral American action. Cur-
rently the Administration is hinting that 
there will be such action to demonstrate 
our determination and strength. Congress 
is pushing it, and has appropriated funds 
for that purpose. The farmers want it, and 
there is a Presidential election next year. 
But, in this interrelated world, unilat-
eral action accomplishes nothing. To be 
sure, the United States, as the world's 
strongest, wealthiest, most powerful na-
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tion and leading agricultural exporter, has 
a responsibility to take the initiative in re-
solving the present dispute. That dispute 
cannot, in truth, be solved without our 
leadership. But we are not so dominant in 
the world of agricultural trade that such a 
dispute can be resolved by our acting 
alone. 
I cannot think of a single unilateral 
trade aggression initiated by the United 
States in modern history that did not in the 
end penalize our farmers, our economy 
and our standing in the world far more 
than it harmed our intended target. The 
grain embargo we imposed upon the 
Soviet Union at the time of its invasion of 
Afghanistan is still an outstanding 
example. 
. Consider these facts. The Soviet 
Union, once a major exporter of grain, had 
become through the failure of its system-
not its farmers, but its system-the world's 
largest irnrorter of grain. At the time of the 
embargo, 1t had suffered two consecutive 
crop failures and its import requirements 
had reached record proportions. The 
United States, by way of contrast, the 
world's largest exporter of grain, was en-
joying two successive years of record pro-
duction and our surplus accumulations 
were enormous. Yet the embargo accom-
plished nothing. Other grain exporting 
countries, such as Argentina, moved in 
' when we moved out. The Soviet Union 
endured little or no hardship. But there 
was considerable hardship here. 
Even today, long after the embargo 
was removed after having no visible effect 
on Soviet policy, our grain sales to Moscow 
remain at minimum levels while still more 
countries have increased their production 
to take our place. As a result of that initia-
tive, our own domestic surplus problem 
was aggravated and our tensions with the 
EEC were thus heightened. Let us not now 
compound and repeat that error by trying 
to resolve these new tensions by imposing 
our will unilaterally. Whatever market 
shares we might gain by new subsidies and 
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expanded aid programs will be more than 
offset through retaliation by our competi-
tors, new burdens on our taxpayers and 
misleading signals to our farmers. 
Second, history teaches us that there is no 
solution in international cartels. EEC officials 
have been suggesting that the tensions of 
open competition in agriculture can be 
avoided in just this fashion. They invite us 
to join them in a world in which the major 
food producers would coordinate sales, 
divide markets, increase prices and would 
also agree upon, and divide the cost of an 
increase in governmental storage of sur-
pluses. Such a plan would be completely 
consistent with the EEC's Common Agri-
cultural Policy which effectively insulates 
Western Europe's farmers from the ups 
and downs of the world market. 
But such a plan would be completely 
inconsistent wifh this country's historic 
principle of free agricultural trade, the 
principle that has enabled us to expand 
food exports so dramatically over the last 
decade. We know, moreover, that such 
cartels are doomed to fail. Their artificially 
high prices ultimately discourage con-
sumption and stimulate production. 
What better example of this than the 
reckless escalation of oil prices by the 
OPEC countries over the last decade? That 
exercise in monopoly commodity power 
was a major factor in creating unprece-
dented inflation, enormous trade deficits, 
record high interest rates, massive debt, 
escalating unemployment, and finally a 
worldwide recession. But those excessive 
prices also triggered increased energy con-
servation, reduced energy consumption, 
and substantial investment in both new 
and alternative energy sources; and those 
developments in turn, combined with the 
global recession, have created today a 
worldwide oil glut, with prices falling, 
agreements breaking, and the members of 
0-PEC scrambling to undersell each other. 
Surely we in the agricultural trade 
learned that same lesson from the various 





as the International Grain Arrangement of 
1967. All went well so long as wneat prices 
were stable. But once the world market 
softened, one exporter after another in-
vented devices to sell below the minimum 
prices established under the agreement. 
Importers were happy to go afong; and the 
agreement soon became irrelevant. It was 
not renewed, and the new International 
Wheat Agreement had no price guidelines. 
Clearly another cartel is not the solution to 
our present problems. 
Third, history teaches us that there is no 
solution in protectionism. This lesson is 
surely too obvious to any thinking person 
to require elaboration. The memory of the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff and its contribution to 
worldwide depression cannot be erased 
that easily. Yet in times of economic stress 
and political pressure, it is all too easy to 
embrace unthinking proposals that appear 
to offer some immediate relief, that place 
the blame for domestic distress on for-
eigners who cannot vote in our elections, 
that advance a simple exception here, a 
compromise there, a mere voluntary quota, 
a temporary restraint, another exception or 
two or three-and then we will awake one 
morning to find nearly forty years of work 
in constructing an open trading system 
gone. 
A time of low economic activity is a 
time to increase, not restrict, trade; a time 
to sponsor new measures of trade expan-
sion and fairness; a time to support those 
intergovernmental institutions that are 
designed to keep production and market-
ing incentives at appropriate levels and to 
move toward freer trade. 
That leads me to my fourth and final · 
lesson from the past: history teaches us that 
there is no solution in aggravating political 
tensions. This is not a time for name-calling 
and finger-pointing between the U.S. and 
the EEC. It is a time to be extra attentive to 
each other's needs and views, to seek joint 
policies, to work through the international 
mstitutions established for that purpose, to 
meet and talk at the highest levels of 
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government. 
Trade abhors tension but follows 
friendship. U.S. agricultural exports to 
China ana the Soviet Union, for example, 
expanded greatly when our political rela-
tions with those nations improved. Just as 
we would not now jeopardize our Chinese 
relations by permitting secondary disagree-
ments to grow out of proportion, and just 
as we should make the most of the USSR's 
change of leadership by exploring its po-
tential need for an improved international 
atmosphere, so, too, should we take care 
today not to permit our disagreements 
with Western Europe to spread, to escalate, 
to sour the crucial political and diplomatic 
unity of the Atlantic Alliance. By rebuild-
ing our political bridges across the Atlantic, 
we can help dismantle its economic 
barriers. 
III. 
So much for the lessons of the past. So 
much for what we cannot do. The more 
difficult question is: what can we do? What 
can we do to prevent an agricultural trade 
war between the United States and West-
ern Europe? There is no single, easy an-
swer. I am not in a position to know all the 
facts or to suggest a technically detailed 
program. But permit me today, speaking 
out of deep concern, to suggest to both 
sides a basic three-step program by which 
we might avoid the war that is otherwise 
coming. 
Step One is the elevation of the U.S.-EEC 
agricultural trade dispute to the highest levels 
of political accommodation and rea[ity. Thus far 
negotiations and argumentation have 
taken place principally (though not exclu-
sively) at the lever of our respective Minis-
ters of Agriculture and Trade, all of them 
subjected to special constituencies whose 
pressures and complaints make any com-
promise difficult. Each side invokes legal 
precedents and technical evidence, not 
political reality. Each Minister demon-
strates to his Head of Government and the 
rural voters that he can be a tough and un-
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yielding negotiator. Settlement will be pos-
sible, I believe, only when on both sides 
the Heads of Government themselves, 
with the help of Foreign Ministers, recog-
nize the neea for a political solution. 
For it is fundamentally a political prob-
lem that we confront. Each side has a polit-
ical face to save. Each side is under strong 
political pressure from its respective 
farmers and their electoral allies, whose 
influence on most governments of the in- , 
dustrialized world far exceeds their num-
bers. Both sides are determined to protect 
their farmers from undue hardship; and 
both sides provide those farmers with too 
much incentive to produce. Both sides 
have adopted policies that help producers 
at the expense of consumers. Both sides 
have been guilty of unilateral restrictions 
and violations of the principle of free trade. 
Both sides have surpfuses they must get 
rid of. And, most damaging of all to the 
prospects for peace, both sides-both the 
U.S. and the EEC-have made politically 
unrealistic demands in this present 
confrontation. 
The United States must realize that 
We~tern Europe's C<?mmon Agricultural 
Pol~cy reflects _a cru~ial twenty-five year old 
political bargam which made possible the 
very founding of the European Economic 
Community. It is at the heart of the unprec-
edented economic and political cooperation 
that the EEC has brought to Western Eu-
rope in place of the wars which ravaged it 
throughout history. The EEC cannot and 
wil~ not give up the Common Agricultural 
Pohcy or the export subsidies that stem 
from it. That is a hard political reality that 
our U.S. negotiators must recognize. They 
~ave continually persisted in repeated fu-
tile efforts to attack the EEC suosidies, to 
demand their reduction or elimination, to 
insist on what never will be. That must 
change. 
Similarly, the EEC has wasted equal 
effort trying to talk the United States into 
forming cartels, abandoning the free mar-





agricultural economy as theirs is from the 
vicissitudes of supply and demand. That 
also is unacceptabfe. That also is unrealis-
tic, for all the reasons already noted. 
It is time for the top political and dip-
lomatic leaders on each side to acknowl-
edge and accept these realities, time for 
them to recognize the political principles 
and pressures that determine the other 
sides course. It is time to seek joint action 
on attainable goals in place of unilateral 
action coupled with unrealistic demands. 
Step two, therefore, is the adoption by both 
parties of a five-year interim agreement, first 
freezing, then gradually reducing the gap in 
their respective agricultural support prices. I 
say five years because it would be politi-
cally unrealistic and economically reckless 
to require of the EEC a lasting solution to 
this mammoth problem in any shorter pe-
riod. I single out the gap in support prices 
because that is the heart of the problem, 
reflected in the EEC over-production, the 
source of the surpluses that the EEC is anx-
ious to sell. The EEC will not reduce its 
export subsidies. The U.S. will not join a 
cartel. But more equal support prices could 
be negotiated and achieved, with some 
compromise from each side, thereby help-
ing to rationalize if not equalize the terms 
of competition. 
One possibility would be application 
of the extremely high EEC supports to a 
declining percentage of its present produc-
tion, with the remainder of that production 
subject to free market prices or to a sub-
stantially reduced support price. At the 
start, a mutual freeze m existing support 
prices will be necessary to prevent this 
troublesome gap from increasing still fur-
ther while the interim agreement is being 
negotiated. Secretary of Agriculture Blocl< 
has proposed such a freeze for U.S. target 
prices in 1984. 
That interim agreement must also in-
clude such measures as may be necessary 
to reduce production and show restraint on 
exports on both sides, in the interests of 
peace during this five year period. More 
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EEC food distribution to needy people 
could help reduce surpluses. More EEC 
surpluses could be stored instead of ex-
ported. None of these measures I am sug-
gesting will be popular, I realize. But they 
can help avoid a disastrous trade war. 
Step Three, the final step, is the develop-
ment by both sides of a joint effort to stabilize 
the economies of the developing world. We are 
quarreling today over markets that are lim-
ited and hard-pressed. When the pie being 
fought over becomes larger, agreements on 
each slice become easier. We tend to forget 
th_e developing countries in our disputes 
with Europe and Japan, but in fact 38% of 
U.S. exports go to these countries. Today, 
unfortunately, they are poorer than ever, 
overburde~ed ~y debt, victimized by low 
raw material pnces, unable to sell their one 
or two basic commodities in these reces-
sionary and protectionist times, and lack-
ing in the foreign exchange necessary to 
buy our products. Ample markets in the 
developing nations for the exports of both 
the U.S. and the EEC will exist only when 
the governments of those nations can re-
cover their economic health. 
Western aid programs are not enough. 
The i_ndustrialized world must take steps to 
alleviate the overwhelming financial bur-
den of the developing nations, to restruc-
ture their debt and to establish new 
institutions_ ~nd _measures to prevent fur-
ther de~tab1h~ahon .. ~he relationship be-
tween fmanc1al stability and trade is crystal 
clear in those nations that are starved for 
foreign exchange to service their debts. 
~nw11ling to spend what little they have on 
imports, desperate to increase their ex-
ports, they are driven to acts of economic 
nationalism that reduce agricultural mar-
kets for the West. 
If these impoverished countries are to 
be able to buy, they must first be able to 
sell. We cannot export to them if we do not 
import from them. All of the Western na-
tions must jointly agree to open our mar-
kets through such plans as the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative. All of us must purchase 
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from them, in a coordinated effort, more 
metals and other basic commodities-even 
above normal requirements-for our na-
tional stockpiles. We must learn better to 
barter our agricultural products in ex-
change for their metals. We must together 
assume the leadership in rebuilding their 
economies and purchasing power, much as 
the United States rebuilt the economies of 
Europe and Japan after the Second World 
War. 
This is not charity. All nations will 
benefit from an expansion of trade in a fi-
nancially healthy world. But none of this 
will be accomplished easily or overnight. 
Detailed implementation will be far 
more difficult than sketching out the three 
broad steps that I have recommended to-
day. No doubt some will say that these 
recommendations are too vague and vi-
sionary; others may say that such a politi-
cal compromise is impossible. But I urge 
political and diplomatic leaders on both 
sides of the Atlantic to consider these 
steps, to weigh the lessons of the past and 
the alternatives we face in the future. War 
is near. Time is short. Those of us who be-
lieve that we are headed for global disaster 
must make ourselves heard. It is in that 
spirit that I have spoken to you frankly 
today. 
For additional copies write: 
Public Affairs Department 
Continental Grain Company 
277 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10172 
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